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Despite the fact that public medical care has being heavily subsidized through a 
statutory national health system there has been a growing number of people who opt to 
enroll in extra private coverage. Using a two part model to infer the insurance decision 
and subsequent amount of insurance chosen we found out that people’s decision over 
private health coverage is not related with their health. The pattern of consumption of 
medical care that is not available in the public sector and a good socio economic 
background were found significant modeling the demand for private health insurance. 




There has been a growing amount of Private Health Insurance (PHI) coverage in 
Portugal over the last decades and already by 2009 1.883.801
1
 people carried some kind 
of private health coverage, an impressive number that is somehow paradoxical since 
public health care is close to free at the point of consumption. The perspectives of 
insurance companies and respective associations have been that the market will 
continue to grow in the future and the availability of private insurance is one central 
aspect of liberalization of the economy. However, all those predictions are tied to  
changes in both demand and supply side will occur but also to the presence of the 
national health system.   
The objective of this study is to provide an overview of demand for PHI in the context 
of the Portuguese National Health System (NHS) by defining the profile of PHI 
subscribers and estimating the effects of different determinants in the decision to insure. 
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 Associação Portuguesa de Seguradores [Portuguese Insurance Association]. 
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Important aspects make the health insurance market very peculiar: the level of 
uncertainty, the information asymmetries between agents and the existence of 
competitive frictions towards governmental presence in the market.  
The NHS provides full coverage for all medical expenses independently of users´ age 
and health status but users can supplement it with private health insurance and thus 
granting both access to public and private medical care. While in the former, each 
person’s contribution provides lifelong and full coverage through progressive taxation, 
in the latter each person’s membership is annual and grants different levels of coverage 
by different contracts with a premium proportional to the health costs that each person 
is expected to have in the future.  
However, at present, due to the actual recessive macroeconomic conditions, government 
is facing pressure to get control over NHS expenditure. Hence, there is an implicit 
pressure shifting the line between what NHS can cover, changing the framework in 
which insurance companies operate. To be able to understand the place of private 
initiative and PHI evolution is fundamental to understand how demand for PHI is 
characterized. In this context it becomes interesting to study what is determining 
people’s decision to pay for extra coverage in the NHS context.  
We use a two part model to derive the insurance decision and the amount at which 
people benefit. The results prove that the attraction of private medical care is that it 
allows people to overcome the specific limitations and problems with the public sector 
as in the private sector general and specialist medical care is faster and more 
comfortable. However, voluntary insurance is not an option extended to all the 
population. People from low socio economic backgrounds and who tend to be sicker 
tend to stay out of private coverage. 
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Our main contribution to the literature comes from our updated data base that was built 
for the purpose of this study, which allows us to infer a wider set of characteristics than 
is usually found in the current literature, since they rely on national health surveys to 
extract some information for the private insurance market.  
This paper is divided into five sections; the second section discusses the features of the 
Portuguese NHS and the role of private insurance. Section three will go through some 
related literature on the demand for VHI. Section Four will describe the model, the data, 
the econometric framework, and the last section is designed for discussion of the results. 
2. Portuguese NHS and the role of private health insurance 
2.1- The Portuguese National Health System 
The approval of article 64 of the Portuguese constitution, in 1976, consecrated the right 
to health protection which would be done by the creation of a universal free national 
health service. By 1979 the NHS was created in a model respecting the public 
administration model: facilities were state property and the staff was public servants. 
The mission of the NHS was to create tools for the state, as financier and supplier of 
public medical services, to grant the supply of medical care and financial protection to 
all citizens in health expenses. For this purpose, policies to modernize medical services 
were developed while at the same time the system that would protect citizens from 
medical expenses was implemented.
2
 From that day on, citizens were under NHS 
coverage which pays the costs of medical treatment. 
Individuals contribute compulsorily to NHS via taxes ensuring all medical treatments 
that are supplied by NHS are available. In practice, no one can be excluded from the 
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system even if they do not pay taxes nor can they avoid tax contributions to the NHS 
even if they will never benefit from public medical treatment. 
The state is expected to control the financial and the operational dimensions of NHS: 
financing this system is a state responsibility which establishes the proportion of 
governmental budget that is devoted to health. With this government grants the supply 
of medical services (paying for facilities, salaries, equipment,…) but also pays for the 
medical costs of each individual (exams, surgeries,…). Since the state pays for all costs 
and individuals are not responsible for their own health cost this drives to abusive and 
unnecessary use of NHS and this led to the approval in 2003
3
 of the implementation of 
user charges, that individuals would have to make, but these were effectively not 
compulsory until in 2010
4
 when penalties were introduced for those who did not pay 
their respective user charges.
5
  
Provision is made on public facilities except in some cases where public facilities are 
not available but considered under NHS. In those situations the NHS has agreements 
with private providers to provide treatment and thus users can look for private care as in 
the case of hemodialysis, laboratory exams, image exams, physiology, endoscopies, 
physical medicine and rehabilitation
 6
.  
The NHS is conceived in a way that users should look for regular medical support by 
their general practitioners in their respective local health care centers and then according 
to their needs and family doctor recommendations go to a specialist consultation, or for 
any other hospital treatment. Also, instances of simple condition such as flu, fever and 
                                                           
3 Lei 47/90 1990 introduces users charges in the system but were only implemented in 2003 with Decree Lei 
173/2003 Art. 1. 
4 Diário da República, 1.ª série — N.º 253 — 31 de Dezembro de 2010, artigo 158º. 
5 Exemptions exist for low income groups. 
6 List of services covered by NHS but that may be provided by private medical care at L 11/1993,de 15 Janeiro. 
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other non severe symptoms should also be treated in local health care centers and then 
according to users’ needs, they may be referred to hospitals. 
However, this system has several problems since many users do not have general 
practitioners and there is uncontrolled access to emergency rooms. These situations 
cause many users to access hospital services directly, leading to long waiting times for 
hospital emergency episodes. For specialist consultation users also face long waiting 
times. As a result, this drives specialists consultations that are provided and funded by 
the NHS are more and more taking place in the private sector.
7
  
In spite of the improvements that have been made in the last decades the NHS fails to 
achieve efficiency, resulting in high costs and inequalities. However, Portugal ranks 
well in the international context in measuring both equity of access and quality of NHS: 
12
th 
compared to the rest of the world.
8
 
2.2- Supplementary health insurance coverage 
On the other hand there has been a rise in the market for private medical care where 
people find modern facilities and faster medical treatment. The main areas provided by 
private care have been general consultancy, specialist consultancy and selected 
surgeries.  
Since out-of the-pocket payments are extremely high, when users benefit from extra 
insurance coverage this lowers the costs of using private medical care. Thus, the 
privately insured population obtains coverage in the case of both unexpected 
hospitalization and access to specialist medical care for which consumption is more 
predictable. 
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 According to Associação Portuguesa de Hospitalização Privada in 2005 already 67,6% of gynecology, 66,4% of 
ophthalmology, 54,2% of cardiology, 45,5% of orthopedics and  31,1% of pediatrics consultancies did take place on 
the private sector. 
8 Find detailed information about equity and efficiency measures by World Health Organization at [21]. 
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Individuals cannot stop their state contributions nor opt out the NHS but they can pay a 
premium to benefit from extra coverage in the private sector which has different 
characteristics: 1. For the period of the contract, while NHS grants lifelong coverage, 
private insurance offers contracts of the nature “year and subsequent”. 2. For the scope 
of the contract, the NHS funds all the medical care available in the public sector while 
private contracts have different levels of coverage depending on the premium paid, but 
it does not cover situations of pré-existing diseases (cancer, HIV,…) or cases where the 




Since individuals are already covered by the NHS which is much more comprehensive 
than private contracts, it is important to understand the nature of PHI in this context. 
The relationship of PHI to state provision is different either they operate in France, 
Germany or Portugal. In these three examples private insurance market faces different 
relationships with NHS. 
Table 1. Summary of relations with NHS 
Relationship with 
NHS 
Example NHS PHI 
Substitutive Germany Income <  X 
 
Income > X  NHS or PHI. 
Never both at the same time 
Complementary France Medical care costs X+ K. 
NHS pay X and user pays K. 
Medical care costs X+ K. 
NHS pay X and PHI pays K 
Supplementary UK, Portugal NHS coverage is compulsory and universal. Private coverage 
is optional and user may accumulate the two coverages. 
 
In the substitutive model, if the annual gross income exceeds a certain threshold
10
, then 
individuals are allowed to leave the public system and opt for exclusive private 
coverage. The complementary system covers medical care that is not included in the 
NHS but also grants co-payments. For the Supplementary case, coverage allows for 
                                                           
9 Associação Portuguesa de Seguradores [Portuguese Insurance Association]. 
10 For Germany this threshold was 49,950 euros in 2010. 
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users to choose if they want only NHS coverage or to get private and public medical 
care simultaneously covered so they can opt for which provider best fulfills their needs.  
 
2.3- The concept of Voluntary Health Insurance 
There are several drivers that determine the actual extent of PHI coverage, however it is 
first important to note that not all contracts are voluntary. This means we find many 
people covered by PHI even though they have not made any direct decision about 
private coverage, so we find in the market people that are not even aware they are 
covered by PHI. This was shown by the results of the Portuguese national survey on 
health conducted in 2005, when close to 20%
11
 of population was covered by PHI but 
only close to 10,5%
12
 of the population had reported to having PHI while the remainder 
were not aware of their coverage. The results show that enrolment is driven not only by 
consumption of private care but also by other mechanisms: 
1- On credit cards where insurance companies induce micro health insurance for their 
members. Usually this is a very basic coverage but represented close to 26% of the 
coverage contracts in 2005. 2- On mortgages where enrolment in some source of health 




Hence, the concept of voluntary health insurance (VHI) is a more restrictive measure 
than the number of contracts covering people. VHI is therefore used to refer to 
individual or group policies for which people decided to pay to supplement the NHS for 
current or expected consumption of private medical care. 
                                                           
11 Data from Associação Portuguesa de Seguradores (2.111.802 contracts); Data from INE ( population 10.549.424) 
12 Data collected from INE[23]. 
13 For example with a 3% spread they would get 0, 5% discount on the spread if they enroll in a PHI that costs X. At 
the end, individual will pay 2, 5%+ X. 
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 Thus, at the empirical level what is relevant is to define the profile of those who enroll 
in voluntary insurance and thus to understand the impacts of the variables that define 
the demand in the respective decision to insure. 
3. Related literature on VHI 
The most common misconception about the reason for individuals wanting voluntary 
insurance is that it is related to health status. An individual’s current health status allows 
to forecast future medical consumption since the current situation is the most reliable 
proxy for future health care needs and respective costs of medical care. Hence, it would 
be expected that people who are actually sicker, with chronic diseases or older would be 
more likely to enroll in a VHI in an effect that is referred in the literature as Adverse 
Selection[16]: sicker people, with information on their health status, are expected to 
demand more future health care and thus generate larger medical expenses. Given there 
is interdependence between medical care and a scheme to grant costs coverage, 
individuals expecting future medical care will in fact have a higher tendency to be 
enrolled in VHI, while healthier people who do not expect to have large medical 
expenses would not find it a good deal since they already have the NHS coverage for 
free.   
Despite health status being correlated with medical care demand, there is limited 
evidence of adverse selection for the decision of purchasing voluntary insurance[19], 
and we can in fact find the opposite: more healthy people are more likely to insure[4]. 
Risk selection on the private insurance markets is verified when the ones that insure 
more are not the sicker people but the healthier ones.  
When trying to attract good risks to their portfolio private insurance companies induce 
high risk people with a tendency to generate more expenses to not look for voluntary 
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insurance by imposing high premiums or ultimately refusing to insure certain health 
situations[15]. 
Sicker people may find more benefits from membership but they face a higher 
probability of being refused higher amounts of coverage or paying higher premiums and 
they find economically more beneficial to use only the NHS. On the other hand 
healthier people will be able to get more complete coverage and get lower premiums, 
they will be more likely to insure once they are faced with more economic appealing 
contracts. 
It is also expected that healthier people are more determined to take precautionary 
behaviour, and one way to behave more actively towards health is having access to 
faster and better medical care[14].  
But if adverse selection gives only a very limited explanation of the household’s 
decision for health insurance or it is more than offset by risk selection, what other 
factors can be found determining those decisions?  
The level of satisfaction with the NHS will generate the first incentive to look to 
alternatives for NHS, and so VHI is the choice to overcome NHS restrictions. Thus, the 
lower the quality of NHS relative to private care, the higher the incentives for people to 
insure [8, 18]. For example, long waiting lists on the NHS can be perceived as reducing 
the quality of the NHS, imposing costs of time or comfort, augmenting dissatisfaction in 
using the public service and thus leading to some individuals finding it worthwhile 
paying for supplementary coverage to find faster and more comfortable medical care[2]. 
Quality of both services is important and the lower is the quality gap between public 
and private care, the less likely it is that people will opt-out of NHS and ultimately, if no 
differences exist between both services there is no benefit from opting for private care. 
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The perception of NHS quality may change according to age and education, with older 
and more educated people being more sensitive to quality gaps. This is because they are 
able to collect more medical information[8]. 
Also the characteristics of the contract plan itself are determinant. The premium paid is 
evidently important. The lower the premium, the more it will determine how many 
people will be able to decide on insure or not. However, it has been found that premium 
elasticities are low, because those who purchase VHI are a high income population who 
are not very discouraged by premium changes[9]. 
The lower the premiums the larger population that will be able to have VHI as an 
option. However, low income groups were found to never be able to participate even if 
premiums are very low since the co-payments are not affordable while on NHS they 
find little or no co-payments[6]
14
.   
Also, if the user was voluntarily insured in the previous year, this will influence his 
propensity to insure in the current year[10]. When satisfaction with private care is 
guaranteed and users have found a contract that fulfills their demands, with everything 
remaining constant (same wage, same level of satisfaction with NHS, etc...) there is no 
incentive to return to NHS nor face search costs in finding another alternative. 
However, most of the literature shows insuring decisions are more determined by socio-
economic variables. In many studies these variables are not only related to the 
propensity to insure but also are more significant in explaining that propensity than 
other variables. Cameron et. all confirmed this hypothesis for Australia[5], Vera-
Hernandez for Catalonia[22], Sanhueza and Ruiz-Tagle for Chile[20], Liu and Chen for 
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Tawain[13], Propper for the UK[17] , Bolhar et. all for Ireland[3], Holly  et. all for 
Switzerland[11]. 
Income is the most relevant variable in insuring decision, reflected in all the studies we 
have studied for two reasons: the first is that for the wealthier people, the relative value 
in monetary terms of the premium is smaller and second also because illness reduces 
healthy time available imposing an opportunity cost that only high incomes are more 
willing to pay. Income was found to have a positive effect on UK, Ireland, Italy, and 
Portugal[12], where supplementary health insurance exists. 
Income is not only important for the membership of VHI but also for the level of 
coverage enrolled. High income groups are expected to choose a more complete 
coverage while lower income groups are expected to opt by basic coverage. For 
statistical proposes we must be careful since it might be that groups of very high earners 
reduce the propensity to insure, making statistics confusing, but one reason that may 
arise is that very high earners may be willing to pay for out-of-pocket costs and assume 
risks and so not be very interested in private insurance contracts[10].  
Age is expected to increase propensity to insure but only up to a certain point and then 
declines[11]. The reason why it declines is because from a certain age on, health tends 
to deteriorate quicker and with a higher magnitude. Insurance companies realize this 
and will charge higher premiums for older people, reducing their propensity once they 
reach a certain age.   
Education is also reported as positively correlated with the propensity to insure. 
Although education brings a lower use of health care in general, the people found to be 
more minded to choose VHI are the more educated ones. Educated people tend to gather 
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more information about the options available and to understand also the limits and 
inefficiencies of the NHS[3].  
Beside socioeconomic variables, the literature finds that the type of medical care 
consumed is also very important when studying the demand for VHI. Previous studies 
have found that the propensity to get VHI is more significant in the case of users of 
specialist consultancy than users of general practice (GP) or even in the case of 
hospitalization[5,8]. Hence, what is shown in the literature is that users will tend to 
enroll in voluntary insurance if the type of medical care they expect to consume is 
regular and thus more predictable.   
The great bulk of PHI in Portugal is obtained in employment-based groups and the same 
is true in most countries where the majority of the existent private health coverage is 
provided through the workplace[7]. 
Group coverage currently accounts for the majority of VHI and is basically dependent 
on firm’s policies. It is a good instrument to give other incentives to employees than 
rising wages. Also, offering PHI to all their employees gives companies access to fiscal 
benefits and thus there are high incentives to promote the offering of health insurance. 
In addition group policies allow for premiums paid per person to be in general lower 
than in individual policies. Companies are more powerful agents than individuals in 
negotiating coverage premiums and also group coverage premiums are based on the risk 
of the group instead of being calculated on the risk individually for each person. Once 
contracts are homogeneous among the group the risk premiums are underestimated[15]. 
On the other hand, group policy contracts are more lucrative than individual policies 
since they enroll higher numbers of people at once, allowing for monitoring 
homogeneous contracts which reduces costs.  
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The results found in the literature suggest that the determinants of demand for the 
voluntary insurance are not a function of an individual’s health but are more likely to be 
a function of the limitations of the NHS and individual’s socio economic characteristics.  
Hence, this study tests the hypothesis found in the literature for individuals’ 
characteristics and public service limitation, but as described in the next section we will 
use a different approach that will categorize a wider set of variables and discuss their 
respective relevance.  
4. Model, Econometric Framework and Results 
The theoretical model is analogous with Propper [16][17] where the decisions around 
voluntary insurance are based on the expected utility for each user of having private 
coverage relative to their NHS coverage. With this approach we can infer that 
individuals will increase their propensity to enroll in voluntary insurance when the 
benefits of having supplementary coverage are higher relative to relying only on the 
NHS. According to this approach, when the benefits and costs of both situations are 
equal, individuals will have the same expected utility and thus they will be indifferent to 
supplementary coverage or not. When costs offset the benefits the propensity to insure 
is assumed to be zero or very close to zero and people are not expected to insure in these 
cases. 
The literature has studied the determinants that influence the VHI decisions through an 
econometric model that gives the propensity to insure of each individual in the sample. 
The model infers the propensity of dichotomous variable outcomes, depending on a set 
of variables that we want to study.  
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Let   be the propensity choice of insuring of individual , depending on the sum of the 
 variables related to health, socio-economic conditions, health status, preferences, and 
the other variables described in table I. 
Equation I: Probit model 
Let the latent variable * follow   	
   	   15  with the observed variable,   
being defined as  
 This model allows to isolate the impact of each variable  on the propensity fixing the 
other variables. Our dependent variable, , takes only the values 1 and 0. Therefore 
maximum likelihood estimation is usually applied in the research. This estimation is 
known has Logit or Probit and we can find studies that opted to use the first model 
while others use the second model.
16
 We will use the Probit in our case. 
To order the interest in private coverage we will model, from those who have voluntary 
insurance, which level of coverage they have. For this, we will use the ordered probit. 
This will allow us to infer if the drivers that set insurance decision are equally setting 
the amount of coverage enrolled in.  
Based on the questionnaire results we can infer which amount of insurance people 
benefit from in the following groups: -Doctor's appointments, ambulatory and 
hospitalization; -Normal childbirth, C-section and abortion; - Stomatology; -Prosthetics 
and Orthotics; -Abroad extension. 
Now the dependent variable will represent an ordinal format as follow: 
                                                           
15 ε~N(0,1). 
16 In the Logit estimation the logistic distribution is used while in the Probit estimation the standard normal 
distribution is used. These estimations are equivalent when we have large sample and do not have a fat tail problem in 




1 group of coverage 2 groups of coverage 3 groups of coverage 4 groups of coverage 5 groups of coverage 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Equation II: Ordered Probit 
Now, let the latent variable * follow   	
   	    with the observed variable, 
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Hence, our two part model will find the following structure:  




Most of the studies rely on the National Surveys on Health to gather some information 
about insurance purchase. This approach provides a good sample of the population 
because these surveys are completed at a national scale but they lack much information 
about private insurance decisions since the purpose of these surveys is not in fact to 
gather information about the insurance market. 
Our study was made using a survey applied to the population of the region of Lisbon. 
By opting to study the population of Lisbon we can conveniently control for some 
problems that may arise in the sample while we expand the set of questions that we 
want to infer. The data was collected through an on- line questionnaire and personal 
interviews. 287 respondents between the age of 18 and 69 have been asked questions 
about different aspects that we found necessary to produce information for our analysis. 
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80% of the sample answered online. The first observation answered our questionnaire 
on 26-10-2011 and the last one on 30-11-2011.
17
 
Although the data collected is not very large, which reduces the representativeness of 
the sample, we do have an advantage in the questions because they were made 
exclusively to infer the characteristics of the demand and thus allow a more detailed 
analysis. The questions cover six groups of relevant information: 




2. Self assessed health (we asked people to assess their own health19) 
3. Personal history: (smoking habits, height, weight, physical limitations, close 
relative illness like cancer, chronic diseases
20
);  
4. Pattern of consumption of medical care (urgencies use preference, number of 
general consultancies, number of consultancies related to chronic diseases, with 
or without GP, subsystem coverage, comparative quality perception between 
private and public medical care, private consultancy in the previous year, type of 
last consultancy
21
, children under six years old); 
5. Preventive behaviour (we asked whether people were passive towards their 
health or not) 
6. People’s relation to health insurance (knowledge about the products available in 
the market, maximum willingness to pay) 
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 Please see the full version of the questionnaire in Annex I. 
18 The variable unemployment is a dummy variable that will be regressed against not being unemployed, this 
meaning it can be employed, self-employed, student or not being looking for a job. 
19 This variable is divided in 3 dummies groups: good, reasonable and bad self assessed status. The god and bad self 
assessed groups will be regressed against the reasonable group. 
20 We asked from a list over the following chronic conditions: Respiratory tract, Digestive apparatus, Urinary 
apparatus, Genital apparatus, Bones and Articulations, Metabolic diseases, Neurological diseases, Skin Diseases, 
Veins, Eyes, Ears, Nose and Throat, Cancer Diseases. See questionnaire in Annex I. 
21 We ask only about the last medical consumption, because it is not expected that people would answer accurately 




It is relevant to remark the difference between the variables in groups 3 and 4: The 
personal history is not mandatorily causal of pattern of consumption of medical care. It 
is important to distinguish between what is the health problem and what is the 
consumption of medical care. We may find healthier people visiting doctors more often 
just for precaution.   
Some of the results were directly plotted into the database (age, sex, ...) while others 
were transformed following previous academic studies (household income,…)
22
. The 
data must be stratified by sex, age, education and income such that it is representative as 
possible of the population. Still, there remains an overweight of high income and 
education respondents
23
.Hence, we reduce the scope of our analysis to our sample 
instead controlling for the bias in income and education. Although our sample is not 
representative of the population of Lisbon, it is still very relevant because we can infer 
the relevant characteristics of insured people. 
Table II shows the estimated effects of characteristics on the propensity of having VHI 
(first two columns) and for the amount of insurance chosen (last two columns). 
Complementing the estimated parameter there are the respective p-values for each 
variable. 
Among the independent variables in our estimate, four variables from the 
socioeconomic group (age, household income and unemployment status), the self health 
status group ( the good self assessed status), two variables from personal history group 
(body mass index, existence of chronic diseases), seven variables of pattern of 
consumption of medical care group (enrolled in a health subsystem, preference for 
urgencies than health center, number of visit to doctors, number of visit to doctors due 
                                                           
22 See Table I. 
23 See Table II. 
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to chronic conditions, having kids until 6, and the last consultancy to be a specialist 
consultancy) and the group over preventive behaviour, do have a lower p-value and 
therefore are significantly more important variables. 
Socio economic group follows the results from literature, with income and employment 
status having strong impacts on the propensity to insure. The results support the 
hypothesis described in the literature except the coefficients for education that is 
insignificant and therefore inconclusive.  
There is limited evidence on personal history group of variables: either they have 
negative impacts or low significances. This goes in accordance to what literature has 
shown about the inconclusive problem that the sicker population will not enroll in PHI. 
In fact, a good self assessed health status was found relevant and significant for the 
propensity to insure. 
The group of pattern of medical consumption variables shows that the type of expected 
medical care highly influences the purchasing decision. Who visit doctors for chronic 
conditions and that went to specialist consultancy lately, are more likely to insure. This 
behavioral identity shows that a moderated and more predictable use of medical care is 
an identifiable factor leading to the need for private coverage. Having children is 
definitely a motive to have private health insurance. 
Preventive behavior is associated with propensity to insure indicating those who are not 
passive towards health do enroll in supplementary coverage. Those who act more 
actively may be suggested to not be willing to have risk attitudes towards their health 
and finding useful to have a supplementary option. 
More surprisingly, most of the coefficients are not significant in the second part of the 
model. Income, good self assessed status and children until six are significant in both 
20 
 
parts of the model. This finding support the hypothesis that a good socio economic 
condition, good self assessed health and the demand for fast access to services are 
important drivers, showing that people decide to insure to overcome NHS problems but 
they must be able to afford that decision.  
5. Conclusions 
People that enroll in the voluntary insurance are characterized for being not unemployed 
and having good economic conditions, meaning they must have the capacity of paying 
for the voluntary insurance. The type of consumption of medical care that they expect to 
have is moderate and having kids is a determinant for coverage the level of coverage 
chosen once they predict a regular consumption of children medical care. Also, people 
enrolled tend to have a better health and to have more precautionary behavior. 
The results show that the impact on socio-economic variables as well and how people 
asses their own health status are important dimensions that drive the insuring decisions. 
The results are consistent with those the literature has been showing.  
Our study finds also that impacts on the pattern of medical care consumption and 
attitude towards health are also important the purchasing decisions. In the group of 
pattern of consumption we find that the performance of private medical care versus the 
public medical care has a high impact on the purchasing decisions. The hypothesis that 
people enroll in PHI to overcome the NHS limitations is correct. 
The general results do show that the variables that influence insuring decisions are not 
representative of the decisions about the amount of insurance chosen. The amount of 
coverage chosen increases highly with income and existence of children. 
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 Projecting the trajectory of the market is today much more complex. On one hand the 
contracts via credit cards and bank mortgages are likely to suffer from the reduction on 
these markets. On the other hand VHI function will suffer a series of shocks that have                                       
contradictory effects. The reduction of income and employment will have a negative 
influence on demand for private insurance. The pressure to control the expenses of NHS 
will reduce the scope of what NHS can cover, thus will have special impact on the 
variables on the group of consumption and thus affecting the likelihood of insuring.  
 Private medical care seems to be more attractive but less affordable and filling the 
market with high uncertainty for what demand will be in the future.  
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 Table I: Definition of variables, full sample 
Variables Mean/ Std Dev Definition 
phi              .48/ .50 1 if respondent has supplementary coverage, 0 if no 
coveragelevel  coverage level of respondents that reported phi. Scale 1-5  








number of years 
1 if respondent reported bad self assessed health, 0 in other case  
1 if respondent reported reasonable self assessed health, 0 in other case 
1 if respondent reported good self assessed health, 0 in other case 
masculin .48 /.50    1 if respondent is male, 0 if no 
education 14./ 3.7        number of years studied 
wagehousehold  1 if <600;                       2 if 601<x<900; 
3 if 901<x<1200;           4 if 1201<x<2000;  
5   if 2001<x<3000;       6 if 3001<x<4000;  
7 if 4001<x<5000;          8 if x>5001 
householdincome 2.73/ 1.51  !"#$%&'($%&)*
+"*'),  -"*'),(  -.&'/#  -0*(1 
unemployer .035/ .18    1 if respondent is unemployment, 0 if no 
selfassessedhealthstatues 3.8 / .62   1 if very bad; 2 if bad; 3 if reasonable; 4 if good; 5 if very good.  
smoke .37/  .48   1 if respondent smokes regularly, 0 if no 
bmi 82.3/ 367.3 !$#%,
2$#%,3   
chornicdiseases .59/  .49  1 if respondent smokes reports any chronic disease, 0 if no 
severeillnesrelative .44/ .49 1 if respondent´s close relative had severe illness, 0 if no 
injury .13/  .33     1 if respondent was injured requiring treatment, 0 if no 
subsystem .34/  .47 1 if respondent is covered by subsystem, 0 if no 
Gp    .75/ .43 1 if respondent has general practitioner, 0 if no 
hospitalurgency .31/  .47    1 if respondent  prefers going to hospital urgencies for basic treatment, 0 if 
prefers going to the local health center 
preferenceprivate .66/  .48    1 if respondent  asses private medical care better than public medical care, 
0 if no 
privateconsultancyt-1 .48/  .5    1  if respondent went to a private doctor last year, 0 if no 
doctorvisits    2.9/ 2.72 number of doctor visits during this year t. 
doctorvisitschronic 1.2/ 1.7 number of doctor visits during current year related to chronic diseases 
kidstil6     .19/ .39 1 if respondent has children until age of 6, 0 if no 
speciality   .39/ .49 1 if last medical care was specialist consultancy, 0 if urgency or general 
preventive       .86/  .35   1 if this year had take preventive behavior on flu, hta, cholesterol raio- x   
0 if no 





Dependent – Insurance Choice 
Table II:  Model of insurance decision and Coverage Level 
 Probit Regression (287 observ) Ordered Probit (138 observ) 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 











education .0345395 0.195 .0089991 0.764 
householdincome .1749037 0.023 .1254744 0.044 
unemployer -1.091505 0.064 .3198288 0.699 
badselfassed  









smoke .2411683 0.207 -.0131787 0.948 
bmi .0006025 0.026 -.0002444 0.272 
chornicdiseases -.4423426 0.032 .0539444 0.809 
severeillnesrelativ .2125076 0.246 .2747923 0.171 
injury -.3224094 0.260 -.0659527 0.835 
subsystem -1.031148 0.000 .0152004 0.953 
gp .1710422 0.424 -.2554059 0.305 
hospitalurgency  .4801577 0.018 .350572 0.106 
preferenceprivate .5337392 0.014 -.148065 0.605 
privateconsultancyt-1 .3670165 0.100 -.0676562 0.798 
doctorvisits -.099057 0.041 .0827596 0.110 
doctorvisitschronic .1683213 0.036 -.0087574 0.921 
kidstil6 .8157608 0.001 .8272917 0.000 
speciality .5807122 0.004 .2635123 0.219 
preventive .9070521 0.002 -.5384432 0.174  
riskaversion .0063166 0.133 .0120754 0.006   
_cons  
 








1- CARACTERIZAÇÃO SOCIODEMOGRÁFICA 
1.1-SEXO * 
Masculino/ Feminino 
1.2- IDADE * 
1.3- QUANTAS PESSOAS CONSTITUEM O SEU 
AGREGADO FAMILIAR? * 
Adultos/ Jovens (18-24) /Crianças(0-18) 
1.4- EM QUE CONCELHO RESIDE? * 
1.5- QUANTOS ANOS DE ESCOLARIDADE 
COMPLETOU, COM APROVEITAMENTO? * 
1.6- QUAL É A SUA SITUAÇÃO LABORAL? * 
Trabalha por conta de outrem/Trabalha por conta própria 
Estudante/ Reformado(a) ou Aposentado(a)/ 
Desempregado(a)/  Outro 
 
2- INFORMAÇÕES GERAIS DE SAÚDE 
2.1- QUAL É O SEU PESO? * 
2.2- QUAL É A SUA ALTURA? * 
2.3- DE UMA MANEIRA GERAL, COMO AVALIA O 
SEU ESTADO DE SAÚDE? * 
Muito bom/ Bom /Razoável/ Mau/ Muito Mau 
2.4- É BENEFICIÁRIO DE ALGUM SUBSISTEMA 
DE SAÚDE? 
ADSE (ASSIST. DOENÇA SERV. ESTADO) 
SSMJ (SERV. MINIST. JUSTIÇA) 
ADM (ASSIST. DOENÇA AOS MILITARES), 
SAMS (SERV. ACÇÃO MÉD. SOC. BANCÁRIOS) 
SAD/PSP OU SAD/GNR 
Outro 
2.5- TEM ALGUM SEGURO PRIVADO DE SAÚDE? 
Sim/ Não 
2.6- SE TEM SEGURO PRIVADO, INDIQUE A 
RAZÃO: 
Resulta de uma decisão individual sua 
Está associado a um empréstimo bancário ou cartão de 
crédito 
Está associado a uma apólice de grupo de trabalho 
Está associado a uma apólice de grupo de família 
2.7- SE TEM SEGURO PRIVADO, INDIQUE OS 
RISCOS COBERTOS: 
Consultas, ambulatório e internamento hospitalar 
Parto Normal, Cesariana e interrupção voluntária de 
gravidez 
Estomatologia 
Próteses e Ortóteses 
Extensão ao estrangeiro 
2.8- CONSIDERA-SE BEM INFORMADO(A) SOBRE 
OS SEGUROS PRIVADOS DE SAÚDE (PREÇOS, 
COBERTURAS, REDE MÉDICOS,ETC...)? * 
Sim/ Não 
2.9-IMAGINE QUE NÃO TEM NENHUM SEGURO 
DE SAÚDE: QUAL O PREÇO MÁXIMO POR 
MÊS QUE ESTARIA DISPOSTO A PAGAR PARA 
ADQUIRIR UM SEGURO DE SAÚDE? * 
0 euros/ Até 7,5 euros/ Até 15 euros/ Até 22,5 euros 
Até 30 euros/ Até 37,5 euros/ Até 45 euros/ Até 52,5 
euros 
 
3 - DOENÇAS CRÓNICAS 
3.1- TEM OS SEGUINTES SINTOMAS? * 
APARELHO RESPIRATÓRIO (Alergias, asmas, 
bronquite, tuberculose ou outras) 
APARELHO DIGESTIVO (Gastrites, úlceras, doenças da 
vesícula ou outras) 
APARELHO URINÁRIO (Infecções, cálculos ou outras) 
APARELHO GENITAL ( Próstata, miomas, quistos, 
nódulos, displasia ou outras) 
OSSOS E ARTICULAÇÕES (Hérnia discal, reumatismo, 
dor ciática, artrose, joanetes, osteoartrose, tendinite ou 
outras) 
DOENÇAS ENDÓCRINAS, METABÓLICAS OU DO 
SANGUE (Diabetes, tiróide, bócio, obesidade, anemia, 
hemofilia ou outras) 
DOENÇAS NEUROLÓGICAS OU MENTAIS (Epilepsia, 
depressões, ansiedade crónica ou outras) 
DOENÇAS DA PELE (Sinais com alterações, eczema, 
quistos ou outras) 
VARIZES (Má circulação, derrames e flebites) 
 
CORAÇÃO E APARELHO CIRCULATÓRIO (Hipertensão 
arterial, enfarte, angina de peito ou outras doenças do 
coração ou vasos sanguíneos ) 
OLHOS (Estrabismo, retinopatia ou outras, excepto 
miopia) 
OUVIDOS, NARIZ E GARGANTA (Otite, sinusite, desvios 
do septo nasal, amigdalites frequentes ou outras) 
DOENÇAS DO FORO ONCOLÓGICO (Cancro/ tumor, 
quisto ou outras) 
3.2- SOFREU ACIDENTE OU LESÃO QUE OBRIGUE 
A FAZER ALGUM TRATAMENTO MÉDICO 
COMO REABILITAÇÃO OU FISIOTERAPIA? * 
Sim, há menos de um ano/Sim, há mais de um ano 
3.3- QUANTAS VEZES, NO ÚLTIMO ANO 
PRECISOU DE RECORRER AO HOSPITAL OU AO 
CENTRO DE SAÚDE, DEVIDO A PROBLEMAS 
INDICADOS EM 3.1 E 3.2? * 
3.4-ALGUM DOS SEUS FAMILIARES DIRECTOS 
(pais, irmã(o)s) SOFRE OU SOFREU DE 
DOENÇA GRAVE? * 
Sim/ Não 
 
4- CUIDADOS DE SAÚDE 
4.1- TEM MÉDICO DE FAMÍLIA? * 
Sim/ Não/ Não sabe 
4.2- ESTE ANO, QUANTAS VEZES É QUE 
CONSULTOU MÉDICOS? * 
4.3-ONDE FOI A ÚLTIMA CONSULTA QUE FEZ? * 
Centro de Saúde/ Hospital do Estado/ Consultório privado 
Hospital Privado/ Outro 
4.4- A ÚLTIMA CONSULTA QUE FEZ, FOI UMA 
CONSULTA: * 
Geral/ Especialidade/ Urgência 
4.5- DE UMA FORMA GERAL COMO CONSIDERA O 
SERVIÇO NOS HOSPITAIS PÚBLICOS? 
4.6- DE UMA FORMA GERAL COMO CONSIDERA O 
SERVIÇO NOS HOSPITAIS PRIVADOS? 
A imagem dos Hospitais ou clínicas 
O atendimento dos médicos 
o conforto das instalações 
O tempo de espera 
4.7- NO CASO DE UMA GRIPE OU INDISPOSIÇÃO, 
ONDE COSTUMA IR? * 
Urgência do hospital/ Centro de Saúde 
4.8- NO ÚLTIMO ANO RECORREU A CONSULTA 
PRIVADA, OU URGÊNCIA EM HOSPITAL 
PRIVADO? * 
Sim/ Não 
5- PLANEAMENTO FAMILIAR 
5.1- TEM FILHO (S) DAS SEGUINTES IDADES? * 
Com menos de 1 ano/ Entre 1 ano e 2 anos 
Entre 2 anos e 3 anos/ Entre 3 anos e 6 anos 
5.2- EM QUE LOCAL FOI ACOMPANHADA A 
GRAVIDEZ? 
Centro de Saúde /Maternidade ou Hospital/ 
Consultório ou Clínica Privada/ Outro 
6-CUIDADOS PREVENTIVOS 
6.2-FUMA DIARIAMENTE? * 
Sim/ Não 
6.3- NO ÚLTIMO ANO: 
Vacinou-se contra a gripe/ Verificou tensão arterial/ Mediu 
o colesterol/ Fez exames de rotina de electrocardiograma, 
raio-x torax ou mamografia/ Não fez nada 
7-RENDIMENTO 
7.1- INDIQUE QUAL O RENDIMENTO MENSAL 
(LíQUIDO) DO SEU AGREGADO FAMILIAR. * 
Menos de 600 euros/  De 601 a 900 euros 
De 901 a 1.200 euros/ De 1.201 a 2.000 euros 
De 2.001 a 3.000 euros/ De 3.001 a 4.000 euros 
De 4.001 a 5.000 euros/ Mais de 5.001 
7.2-Suponha que lança um dado: Se saírem os 
números 5 ou 6, ganha 100€. Se saírem os 
números 1,2,3 ou 4 não ganha nada. Qual é o valor 
MÁXIMO que está disposto a pagar para 
poder jogar este jogo? * 
0€/ 10€/  20€/ 30€/ 40€/ 50€/ 60€/ 70€/ 80€/ 90€/ 100€ 
Anex I: Questionário à Saúde (original version) 
